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ABSTRACT
This article contributes to literature on gender and austerity by
analysing recent neoliberal transformations of governance that
have facilitated the adoption of highly gendered austerity
measures and constrained the conditions for gender equality
policy in Finland. It examines two austerity-enhancing governance
reforms: the national implementation of the new European Union
(EU) economic governance rules and the OECD-inspired reform of
the government’s political steering process. Whereas the EU-
reinforced development of a new steering model for public
ﬁnance has made austerity a permanent state of aﬀairs, the
reform of the government’s political steering process has
subsumed all other political goals to the ﬁscal frame and pushed
gender equality oﬀ the political agenda. Both governance reforms
have depoliticised and de-democratised political decision making,
making it more diﬃcult to contest the gendered consequences of
austerity.
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Introduction
The austerity policies adopted across Europe in the aftermath of the ﬁnancial, economic,
and euro crises have been shown to be profoundly gendered. Women – in particular, low
income and minority women – have borne the brunt of the cuts to public services and
social beneﬁts, and discrimination against women in the labour market has increased.
Cuts in public services have refamiliarised and reprivatised care, reinforcing the unequal
division of care responsibilities (see Bassel and Emejulu 2017; Kantola and Lombardo
2017; Karamessini and Rubery 2014). As feminist and other scholars have pointed out,
the idea of ‘crisis’ has also been used to push through neoliberal governance reforms,
such as the EU’s new economic governance rules, which have led to gender-biased pol-
icies (Bruﬀ and Wöhl 2016; Klatzer and Schlager 2015). This article contributes to literature
on gender and austerity by analysing in more detail how governance reforms have con-
tributed to gendered austerity politics. The article thus turns attention from the gendered
eﬀects of speciﬁc austerity measures to austerity-enhancing shifts in economic govern-
ance and policy-making practices.
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I study the austerity-enhancing transformations of governance in Finland, a northern EU
member state and euro country. Finland constitutes an interesting case for two reasons.
Firstly, Finland is often placed on the top of diﬀerent gender equality indices and under-
stands itself as a forerunner of gender equality in Europe (Jauhola and Kantola 2016). Sec-
ondly, it is one of the rare European countries that adopted austerity voluntarily (Blyth
2017, 7). In comparison to many EU countries, Finland still has a generous public service pro-
vision and social security system. However, since the recession of the early 1990s, the country
has shifted from a Nordic welfare state towards a new type of state that has been character-
ised as a ‘competition state’ (Kantola and Kananen 2013). After the ﬁnancial and economic
crisis of 2007–2009, Finland was a latecomer to austerity even though the crisis hit Finland
harder than many other European countries. The ﬁrst austerity measures were adopted in
2011, and the then government worked hard to raise public awareness of the ‘crisis’ (J
Kantola 2018). However, austerity did not reach its peak until 2015 when a new conserva-
tive-right government adopted signiﬁcant cuts in services and beneﬁts.
In this article, I ask how two speciﬁc governance reforms implemented in 2015 con-
tributed to the intensiﬁcation of austerity in Finland. The ﬁrst of these – the development
of a new steering model for public ﬁnance – is connected to the shift toward a more rule-
based economic governance. The second is the reform of the government’s political
steering process, which was aimed at making the government’s work more strategic.
This reform is part of the long tradition of managerialist New Public Management
(NPM) reforms, which have brought private sector management practices to the govern-
ment and the public sector. Both reforms are part of a transnational development:
Whereas the steering model for public ﬁnance was developed in response to the
EU’s new economic governance rules, the government reform was inspired by the
OECD’s recommendations. Therefore, in addition to shedding light on Finnish austerity,
the analysis has relevance also in other national contexts where similar governance
reforms have been implemented.
The multidisciplinary theoretical framework of my analysis draws on feminist and other
literature concerning neoliberal transformations of the state with a particular focus on
shifts in public governance (for example, Brown 2015; Larner 2000). In my analysis, I bring
together literature on the gendered character of recent shifts in economic governance (for
example, Bruﬀ and Wöhl 2016; Klatzer and Schlager 2015) with insights on the de-democra-
tising and depoliticising tendencies visible in both economic governance and managerialist
governance reforms (for example, A Kantola and Seeck 2011; Saint-Martin 2000). In my analy-
sis, I ask how the Finnish reforms have facilitated and legitimised the adoption of gendered
austerity measures and how the de-democratising and depoliticising aspects of the reforms
have inﬂuenced the possibilities of feminist and other actors to contest austerity.
I study the processes behind the two governance reforms and the ways they were
framed as well as their eﬀects on policy making processes through policy documents
complemented with research interviews and newspaper articles. The ﬁrst set of policy
documents consists of key Finnish ﬁscal policy documents in the 2010s, such as govern-
ment programs, central government spending limits, and General Government Fiscal
Plans (n = 15). The second set is connected to the development of the new steering
model for public ﬁnance and contains EU laws and treaties, national legislation, and
background documents related to the development of the model (n = 8). The third set
includes documents connected to the reform of the government’s political steering
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process (n = 11), which are reports of development projects within government admin-
istration and reports by external actors, such as the OECD. In the case of the steering
model for public ﬁnance, analysis of policy documents is complemented with infor-
mation derived from interviews with Ministry of Finance civil servants (n = 8) who
have either been directly involved in the reform or who are in a senior position in the
Ministry.1 Newspaper material collected from Finland’s largest newspaper, Helsingin
Sanomat, through keyword searches around key time periods is used to illustrate the
extent of public debate around the governance reforms as well as the discourses used
in these debates (n = 20).
My analysis suggests that the intensiﬁcation of austerity in Finland is connected to shifts
in economic governance as well as to managerialist reforms in policy-making that have
intertwined to the detriment of gender equality. In addition to facilitating the adoption
of gendered austerity policies in diﬀerent ways, the reforms have made it harder for fem-
inist movements to challenge gendered austerity.
The ﬁrst section introduces the theoretical framework of the study, and the second
section provides a short account of austerity in Finland. I will then turn to the creation
of a new steering model for public ﬁnance that was developed in response to the new
EU requirements. The fourth section looks at the OECD-inspired reform of the govern-
ment’s political steering process, which aimed at making the government’s political
process more strategic. I conclude with a discussion on the consequences of the gendered,
depoliticising and de-democratising governance reforms for feminist anti-austerity
resistance.
Gendered, De-democratised and Depoliticised Governance in a
Competitive and Strategic State
In this section, I draw on feminist and other literature on neoliberal transformations of
state and governance to build towards a framework for analysing how recent governance
reforms have contributed to gendered austerity in Finland. I propose that in order to
understand the full implications of those reforms, it is important to address their gendered
as well as their de-democratising and depoliticising eﬀects.
Under the expansion of neoliberal rationality, economic values and priorities such as
competitiveness and eﬀectiveness have been disseminated to the state at the expense
of democratic and social values and principles (Brown 2015). Feminist literature on the
transformations of the state in diﬀerent geopolitical contexts has pointed out that the
shift from the welfare state to neoliberal ‘competition state’ – visible in policies as well
as in governance – has had been a gendered one. Prioritisation of global competitiveness,
cuts in public spending, and subjugation of social policies to the needs of the market have
shifted gender relations and created new class-based, ethnic, and global distinctions
between women. For instance, while women’s labour and human capital are increasingly
required to support international competitiveness, social reproduction is refamiliarised
and reprivatised due to the withdrawal of the state from social provisioning and the mar-
ketisation and privatisation of public services (see Bakker 2003; Sauer and Wöhl 2011;
Walby 2015). These shifts in policies have been supported by New Public Management
(NPM) and other governance reforms that have made market concepts and techniques,
such as performance management, cost–beneﬁt calculations and audit, the regulatory
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ideals of public governance (Larner 2000). In addition to having gendered impacts, the
welfare state restructuring and NPM reforms have inﬂuenced gender equality policy:
funding for women’s policy agencies has been reduced and market priorities and practices
have begun to shape gender equality policy, leading to worries about co-optation (for
example, Kantola and Squires 2012; Sawer 2007).
In addition to being gendered, transformations of state and governance have a de-
democratising and depoliticising dimension. NPM reforms have shifted attention away
from the democratic aspects of decision-making, for example, through allowing private
actors to invade the arena of political power, thus weakening government accountability
(see Saint-Martin 2000; Ylönen and Kuusela 2019). At the same time, political questions are
increasingly deﬁned as problems of governance with rational solutions (A Kantola 2006),
and neutral-seeming managerialist practices are used as a means to justify various political
goals (Kantola and Seeck 2011).
These gendering, de-democratising, and depoliticising tendencies are at their most
visible in recent shifts in economic governance, in other words, in the policies, rules and
processes through which governments manage the economy. Feminist and other scholars
have pointed out how economic decision-making has (often in the name of economic
necessity and on the pretext of the economic crisis) been subordinated to binding legal
or constitutional rules, such as the EU’s debt and deﬁcit rules and the ‘debt brakes’
adopted in many countries. The new, more authoritarian and coercive modes of economic
governance move economic policy away from the oversight of democratic decision-
making bodies to ﬁscal bureaucracies and executive branches, and the economic govern-
ance rules may be diﬃcult for future generations to overturn (Bruﬀ and Wöhl 2016). Econ-
omic governance reforms have de-democratised economic decision making also through
narrowing the space for democratic debate and civil society participation (Kantola and
Lombardo 2017). In addition, binding legal rules depoliticise economic policy in the
sense that they allow governments to externalise responsibility for imposing ﬁnancial dis-
cipline and remove these policies from the area of contestation and contingency (Wood
and Flinders 2014).
Economic governance has always been profoundly gendered: its key concepts and indi-
cators are based on gendered background assumptions, which are visible, for instance, in
the prioritisation of productive work over social reproduction (Hoskyns and Rai 2007;
O’Dwyer 2018). Meanwhile the apparent gender neutrality of these concepts obscures
inequalities between women and men and the way economic policies may entrench
these inequalities (Bakker 1994). The new, rules-based modes of economic governance
strengthen the implicit gender bias of macroeconomic policies (Klatzer and Schlager
2015), lead to spending cuts that disproportionally aﬀect women (Bruﬀ and Wöhl 2016)
and make it more diﬃcult to make gender equality friendly economic policy (Young
2002, 300). Recent economic governance reforms are gendered also in the sense that
they have shifted power to male dominated institutions governed by masculine norms
(Klatzer and Schlager 2015) and privileged masculine economised knowledge over
alternative solutions and feminist knowledge (Bruﬀ and Wöhl 2016; Cavaghan 2017).
In Finland, the shift to rules-based economic governance connected to the competition
state paradigm has taken place side by side with a much less studied set of governance
reforms which aim at making the state more strategic. The view that states should be
not only more competitive and eﬀective but also more strategic gained some attention
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in the context of the NPM reforms of the 1980s and 1990s (for example, Pollitt and Bouck-
aer 2004), and that notion has reappeared in debates about public governance in the
2010s. One of the key actors behind the reappearance of this view was the OECD,
which adapted the concept of ‘strategic agility’ from business management literature
and has employed related concepts in its public governance reviews of several European
countries, including Finland (Mykkänen 2016b). The emphasis on strategic vision can be
seen as the latest managerialist trend that extends private sector management practices
to the state (Ylöstalo and Adkins forthcoming). In contrast to the eﬃcient and disciplined
competition state, a strategic state is agile and ﬂexible, visionary and prioritising, and
equipped with a strong, fast-acting executive arm (see OECD 2010). Like the competition
state, the strategic state has been argued to be a diﬃcult partner for gender equality
(Elomäki, Kantola, Koivunen and Ylöstalo 2016; Elomäki and Ylöstalo 2017), but there is
to date very little knowledge of the potential de-democratising and depoliticising
eﬀects of such strategic reforms.
These insights into the gendered, depoliticised, and de-democratised governance in a
competitive and strategic state guide my analysis on the role of recent governance
reforms in gendered austerity politics in Finland. It is my contention that to understand
the full implications of these reforms, it is crucial to complement the analysis of the
ways in which they have facilitated and legitimised the adoption of gendered austerity
measures with an analysis of how they have de-democratised and depoliticised decision
making. In other words, governance reforms may also contribute to gendered austerity
through constraining the possibilities of feminist and other actors to contest austerity.
Gendered Austerity in Finland
At the beginning of the economic and euro crisis, Finland’s budgets were on surplus and
its debt-to-GDP ratio was well below the 60 per cent threshold set by the EU. In 2009, Fin-
land’s economy contracted by almost nine per cent, more than in almost any other EU
member state (Holmström, Korkman and Pohjola 2014). At ﬁrst, in line with the rest of
the EU, Finland tried to tackle the crisis with a ﬁscal stimulus, but soon the Ministry of
Finance called for ﬁscal discipline and the idea of austerity began to gain ground
among the political elite and in the media (Harjuniemi and Ampuja 2018, 7–8).
Although the right-conservative government of Prime Minister Juha Sipilä, which took
oﬃce in 2015, became the public face of austerity in Finland, the previous rainbow
coalition government of Prime Minister Jyrki Katainen (2011–2015) had already decided
on signiﬁcant ﬁscal consolidation. This ﬁrst phase of austerity was characterised by a
certain reluctance as austerity was a diﬃcult topic for a government consisting of six ideo-
logically diverse parties. This was evident in the government program, which portrayed
economic growth and employment as the main tools to stabilise public ﬁnance and
declared that consolidation would come equally through tax hikes and spending cuts
(PMO 2011a, 7, 9). As the idea that public ﬁnances were in crisis caught on, the govern-
ment ﬁrst launched structural reforms (Structural Reform Program, 2013), which in
Finland are less divisive than spending cuts (Harjuniemi and Ampuja 2018, 11). Eventually,
the government instituted more tax hikes and spending cuts (Ministry of Finance 2014a,
11–12). The proposed measures included several gendered elements, such as cuts in child
beneﬁts, and an increasing emphasis on caring for the elderly at home (J Kantola 2018).
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The necessity of austerity became the main frame of political debate before the 2015
parliamentary elections. The terms of the debate were set by the civil servants of the Min-
istry of Finance, who estimated in a report published just before the elections that the ‘sus-
tainability gap’ was €10 billion and recommended €6 billion of immediate ‘adjustments’ to
be implemented mainly through expenditure cuts (Ministry of Finance 2015a).
Political parties across the political spectrum accepted the Ministry of Finance’s view
that austerity was the only real option, disagreeing mainly on the extent and timing of
the cuts (Elomäki, Kantola, Koivunen and Ylöstalo 2016). The prominence of the no-alterna-
tive discourse and the treatment of the Ministry of Finance recommendations as objective
scientiﬁc knowledge discursively depoliticised austerity by concealing contingency and
making contestation diﬃcult (see also Wood and Flinders 2014). The already signiﬁcant
role of the Ministry of Finance in setting the parameters of the economic policy debate
(Kantola and Kananen 2013; Yliaska 2014) was emphasised.
Prime Minister Sipilä’s government, which consisted of three right-wing parties, includ-
ing the populist the Finns Party, committed to austerity more explicitly than its predeces-
sor, announcing that ‘Finland is in a spiral of decline’ (PMO 2015, 7) and that the
‘[r]ebalancing of public ﬁnances will start immediately’ (10). One major political decision
with gendered consequences was that the tax ratio would not be increased. All the
planned €4 billion (1.7 per cent of GDP) ﬁscal consolidation was to take place through
expenditure cuts. These included, among other things, cuts and index freezes in social
beneﬁts, which were found to increase economic inequality between women and men
(Elomäki and Ylöstalo 2018), as well as cuts in public services, such as the restriction of stat-
utory childcare rights. Spending cuts were accompanied by other gendered policies to
improve public ﬁnances. These included competitiveness policies that hit low-paid
women working in the public sector the hardest as well as a market-oriented reform of
social and health care services that eventually was withdrawn in February 2019 due to con-
stitutional problems.
Austerity in Europe has been connected to the decreased importance of gender equal-
ity as a political goal (Karamessini and Rubery 2014, 333–336), and this tendency is visible
in Finland as well. The Sipilä Government’s government program was the ﬁrst in 20 years
that did not set priorities in this area. The program contained only one sentence about
gender equality – ‘Finland is also a land of gender equality’ (PMO 2015, 8) – which
reﬂects the common assumption in Finland that gender equality has already been
achieved.
In Finland, the critical public debate about austerity, both in general and from a gender
perspective, focused on the eﬀects of spending cuts. Much less attention was paid to aus-
terity related governance reforms prepared under Prime Minister Katainen’s rainbow
coalition government and implemented by Prime Minister Sipilä’s right-conservative gov-
ernment. I will next ask how two speciﬁc reforms – the development of a new steering
model for public ﬁnance and the reform of the government’s political steering process
– contributed to gendered austerity and the sidelining of gender equality.
New Steering Model for Public Finances Facilitates Gendered Austerity
When Prime Minister Sipilä’s right-conservative government began to implement its aus-
terity program, it was able to rely on a new steering model for public ﬁnance, which had
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been developed under Prime Minister Katainen’s government. Like the previous major
economic governance reforms aimed at budgetary discipline in Finland (Kantola and
Kananen 2013; Yliaska 2014), the development of the new model took place during a
recession. This time, however, the main push did not come from the Ministry of Finance
but from the EU.
In the aftermath of the economic and euro crisis, EU economic governance has under-
gone signiﬁcant transformations, which have had far-reaching consequences for the econ-
omic policies of member states, in particular, eurozone countries like Finland. Existing
economic governance rules, such as the debt and deﬁcit thresholds, have been strength-
ened and EU institutions have been provided with new tools and procedures to scrutinise
national policies. It has been argued that these reforms have had gendered consequences
and that they have de-democratized decision making processes at national and EU levels
(see Bruﬀ and Wöhl 2016; Kantola and Lombardo 2017; Klatzer and Schlager 2015; Wöhl
2014).
In addition to being subsumed to strengthened scrutiny and sanction mechanisms,
member states have been required to reform national ﬁscal and budgetary policy pro-
cesses, including through integrating a country-speciﬁc medium term budgetary target
aiming at balance or surplus to national legislation. In Finland, this requirement, made
in the intergovernmental Fiscal Compact, was implemented through the Finance Politics
Act. The Act required the government to set a ‘medium term budgetary objective’ regard-
ing the structural position of public ﬁnance and created an ‘automatic correction mechan-
ism’ that forces the government to act if the target is not reached (see Act 869/2012). The
Act altered the Finnish ﬁscal policy landscape by making the EU’s rule-based approach and
budgetary discipline the legal foundation of national ﬁscal policy.
A less debated and contested yet possibly more signiﬁcant outcome of the new EU
requirements was the development of the new, more rules-based steering model for
public ﬁnance. The main governance tool of the new model is the General Government
Fiscal Plan (GGFP), a ﬁscal and budgetary framework that sets binding targets for structural
deﬁcit or surplus as well as expenditure ceilings for all public ﬁnance: central government,
local government, public social security, and pension funds. Under the new steering model
each government adopts, in the beginning of its term, a four year GGFP and revises it
annually. The GGFP has become the key document of public ﬁnance management in
Finland. It provides the framework for the preparation of the state budget and legislation
and decision making on new policies and spending cuts increasingly takes place during
the annual revision of the GGFP rather than during the preparation of the state budget
(see Ministry of Finance 2016).
From the very beginning, the GGFP was framed as a tool for budget discipline. Prime
Minister Katainen’s Government announced on its website on 3 April 2014 that ‘[w]ith
the introduction of the plan, the Government wants to safeguard the sustainability of
public ﬁnances’. The GGFP is a powerful disciplinary tool because it consolidates several
existing and new tools into one document and monitoring process. First, it includes the
central government spending ceilings, a tool used by the Ministry of Finance since the
1990s to ensure strict budgetary discipline and reduce public expenditure (Kantola and
Kananen 2013, 816–817). Second, the GGFP serves as the medium term budgetary frame-
work for all public ﬁnance and the midterm ﬁscal plan required by the recent EU directive
of budgetary frameworks (Council Directive 2011/85/EU). Finally, the GGFP functions as
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the multiannual ﬁscal program (‘Stability Program’) that EU member states annually
submit to the European Commission in the framework of the European Semester
process in order for the EU institutions to ensure that member states are on track for reach-
ing their debt, deﬁcit, and structural deﬁcit targets.
Merging national ﬁscal and budgetary planning tools with EU-level policy surveillance
subsumes national policy to EU-level ﬁscal rules and objectives. For example, under the
new system, the government’s decision on central government spending ceilings must
be in line with the country speciﬁc structural deﬁcit target set by the EU (Ministry of
Finance 2015b, 33). In general, the new model is more rule-based than its predecessor,
fulﬁlling the EU requirements of national ‘numerical ﬁscal rules’ and ‘comprehensive
and transparent budgetary objectives’ (Council Directive 2011/85/EU). This is concretely
visible in the structure of the GGFP: the second section is entitled ‘National objectives
and rules guiding public ﬁnance management’.
From a gender perspective, the most problematic consequence of the reform is that the
ﬁscal governance of the care and welfare services that are crucial for gender equality and a
major provider of employment for women is tightened. In Finland, the local government
sector organises and ﬁnances welfare services such as basic health care, elderly care, child-
care, and primary and secondary education. It has a broad autonomy, but the new system
provides the central government with tools to balance municipal ﬁnances. Namely, the
GGFP extends the binding framework budgeting process from the central to local govern-
ments and includes a binding expenditure ceiling for local governments that ‘limits the
growth of municipal spending or sets an objective for how much the government must
decrease municipal spending’ (Ministry of Finance 2015b, 42). The interviews with Ministry
of Finance civil servants conﬁrm that a key aspect of the reform was to discipline local gov-
ernments and address the increasing of public service costs, characterised as the ‘care
bomb’ (Interview 1).2
The idea that the costs of public care must be controlled for the sake of ﬁscal stability
reinforces a gendered understanding of the economy where reproductive work is not
valued and public care services are seen as a cost to be cut. More concretely, the new
tools to limit public spending on welfare services may lead to policies that refamiliarise
and reprivatise care and social reproduction. For example, Prime Minister Sipilä’s govern-
ment’s spending cuts included weakening the legal minimum standards for child and
eldercare and restricting statutory children’s rights (PMO 2015). When some municipalities
refused to implement the proposed cuts to childcare, the government announced, in the
context of the annual assessment of the GGFP, that additional measures would be intro-
duced to ensure that the expenditure ceiling for municipal spending would hold (Ministry
of Finance 2016, 45).
The expenditure ceiling for municipal ﬁnance may also close doors on certain ways to
promote gender equality. If governments are not allowed to increase local government
spending, they cannot take measures to improve the salaries and working conditions in
the female dominated care and education jobs in the public sector or the quality and avail-
ability of elder and childcare. Indeed, the expenditure ceiling has lead the government to
propose fewer new policies that would increase local government spending (Interview 5).
Despite its importance from the gender perspective, the GGFP – unlike the annual
budget that in Finland includes some gender analysis – is a gender-blind document,
reﬂecting the way ﬁscal and macroeconomic policy is often seen as particularly gender
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neutral (Cavaghan 2017). The abstract and numerical language of debt and deﬁcit levels,
growth rate, sustainability gap and adjustments, and the technical concepts of EU econ-
omic governance (for example, ‘midterm objective for structural budgetary position’)
that frame the document make it diﬃcult to understand that it contains decisions that
aﬀect everyday lives in a gendered way.
In addition to being gendered, the reform of the public ﬁnance management process
had implications for democratic and public deliberation about ﬁscal policies. The new
steering model was developed in working groups consisting only of Ministry of Finance
oﬃcials (Ministry of Finance 2015b, 17, 51) with a limited involvement of stakeholders
and restricted parliamentary debates (Interview 1). Whereas the Finance Politics Act
caused some critical debate in the Parliament and the media, the new steering model
was prepared almost without any critical scrutiny. Moreover, the model shifts power
over public ﬁnances from local, democratically elected bodies to the central government
and, in particular, to the Ministry of Finance, which is in charge of preparing the local gov-
ernment ceilings (Ministry of Finance 2015b, 24).
Although the new austerity-facilitating steering model for public ﬁnance was devel-
oped in response to EU requirements, and although the EU also pushed Finland to auster-
ity through warnings and recommendations, austerity was not imposed on Finland by the
EU. Rather, the new steering model can be seen as the latest phase in the long continuum
of neoliberal governance reforms pushed forward by the Finnish elites (see also, Kantola
and Kananen 2013; Yliaska 2014). Many of the model’s features, such as centrally deter-
mined budgetary frames and spending ceilings for local governments, are familiar from
the Finnish NPM and budget reform agenda of the 1980s and 1990s (see Yliaska 2014,
181–195, 270–276, 408–427). The EU’s new economic governance rules have thus
helped to implement long lasting aspirations to centralise power over resources and
limit local government spending on public services. Similarly, the European Commission’s
warning to Finland about excessive deﬁcit during the government negotiations in 2015 –
represented by leading politicians as ‘a very serious message’ (Helsingin Sanomat May 13,
2018) – was not the reason behind the intensiﬁcation of austerity but rather functioned as
an additional argument for unpopular policies (Interview 2; 3).
New Political Steering Process Backs Austerity and Limits Contestation
The economic governance reform described in the previous section was planned and
implemented side by side with a reform of the government’s political steering process.
Prime Minister Sipilä’s austerity intensifying government program was the ﬁrst ‘strategic
government program’ in Finland, and the government talks also took a new form. While
in the media, the new procedures were often connected to the Prime Minister’s back-
ground as an engineer and a CEO (for example, Helsingin Sanomat May 8, 2015), in fact,
the reform had been planned for several years by actors within and outside the govern-
ment (see Elomäki, Kantola, Koivunen and Ylöstalo 2016; Mykkänen 2016a).
In Finland, the long standing eﬀorts to make the government’s decision making more
strategic intensiﬁed in the 2010s after the OECD published a public governance review
where it criticised Finland for the lack of ‘strategic agility’ (Mykkänen 2016b; OECD
2010). The OECD’s concerns about the inability of the government to act in the fast chan-
ging environment were taken forward in development projects carried out by the Prime
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Minister’s Oﬃce and the Ministry of Finance. The purpose was to improve the implemen-
tation of government programs and make the government’s political steering process
more eﬀective through emphasising the government’s ‘strategic vision’. The projects rec-
ommended changes, among other things, to the procedure of government talks, the
format of the government program (which in Finland, has often been long and detailed),
and the process of its implementation (Ministry of Finance 2014b; PMO 2011b). Also, Sitra,
the inﬂuential, publicly funded think tank, advocated for such reforms (Doz and Kosonen
2014).
Before the 2015 Parliamentary elections, the need for a strategic vision was brought
into public debate, in particular, by the leader of the Centre Party and the future Prime
Minister Juha Sipilä. However, other parties also adopted the new discourse (Mykkänen
2016b, 232–233). Prime Minister Sipilä’s Government implemented many of the develop-
ment projects’ and Sitra’s recommendations. The most visible change was that the govern-
ment program was much shorter than its predecessors and replaced the traditional
sectoral approach with a limited number of horizontal priorities and key projects
(Elomäki, Kantola, Koivunen and Ylöstalo 2016, 380). Politicians emphasised in the
media that the ways of working had also changed. The new ‘strategic’ approach to gov-
ernment talks and government work was represented, among other things, as reﬂecting
together about long term vision and challenges, a clear process, commitment, and colle-
gial working methods, such as a shared oﬃce space (see Helsingin Sanomat May 11, 2015;
May 25, 2015).
One of the core outcomes of the reform was, however, an economic one: it strength-
ened the already prominent idea of the primacy of the ﬁscal and economic policy over
other policy goals. One of the key premises of the OECD review, development projects,
and Sitra studies had been that the coordination between budgeting and policy
content should be strengthened and ﬁscal matters should take the lead. For example,
the ﬁnal report of the development project led by the Ministry of Finance stated that:
‘[i]nstead of the current two separate steering processes (government programme
process and framework budgeting process), the government should have a steering
process in which goals related to policy content are adjusted to the frame of the
economy’ (Ministry of Finance 2014b, 9). Concrete proposals to this end included begin-
ning the government talks with the ﬁscal frame (PMO 2011b, 9) and integrating the prep-
aration of the government’s action plan with the preparation of the GGFP (Ministry of
Finance 2014b, 5).
Following these recommendations, the government talks and the government
program were reformed in such a manner that all other policy goals were subsumed to
ﬁscal and economic policy. The government talks began with the ﬁscal frame, and
decisions about spending cuts were made before actual policy priorities were discussed
(Mykkänen 2016a, 22). The shorter and more general format of the government
program meant that the program was ﬁrst and foremost a ﬁscal program and the list of
expenditure cuts was its most detailed component. The broadly supported idea of stra-
tegic policy making thus acted as a vehicle for advancing a politically more controversial
goal and facilitating the adoption of gendered austerity.
The reform of the political steering process had other gendered consequences as well,
namely, it restricted the conditions of gender equality policy. It is no coincidence that the
ﬁrst ‘strategic government program’was the ﬁrst government program in 20 years that did
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not include gender equality goals and measures. In strategic political steering focused on a
few horizontal priorities and large reforms and dominated by ﬁscal policy, there is little
room for gender equality as a separate policy area on the political agenda (Elomäki,
Kantola, Koivunen and Ylöstalo 2016). Furthermore, the extension of the strategic
approach – shorter papers, fewer priorities, separation between long and short term objec-
tives, and concrete measures to address measurable short-term objectives – to the ﬁeld of
gender equality policy weakened this policy. The government’s Gender Equality Action
Plan, which was drafted in the spirit of the strategic government programme and
adopted in May 2016, focused on a narrow number of issues, sidelining some long term
goals of the Finnish gender equality policy, such as the equal sharing of care responsibil-
ities between parents. Gender inequality appeared as a technical problem to be split into
short and long term goals solved with concrete measures, which in the Action Plan were
few and rarely matched with resources (Elomäki and Ylöstalo 2017).
The reform of the government’s political steering process has also made it more
diﬃcult for feminist actors to challenge gendered austerity. On the one hand, the
reform increased the inﬂuence of the Ministry of Finance and strengthened the executive
arm while making it harder for civil society to make itself heard. The Ministry of Finance
was assigned an unusually signiﬁcant role during the government talks: in addition to
setting the framework for the talks, it also provided the concrete list of spending cuts
(Mykkänen 2016a, 22). This meant that political decisions about the cuts were made
without any prior assessment of their gender impacts. The gender impact assessments
prepared by line ministries and outside actors later in the process were, in most cases,
not able to inﬂuence the outcome. Meanwhile, women’s organisations failed to get
any of their requests accepted in the government program. While part of this failure
can be attributed to the conservative ideologies of the coalition parties, the new govern-
ment talk procedure and the new government program format were also to blame. In
addition, the reform’s explicit aim to strengthen the political executive has made
decision making more authoritarian. This has, for example, in the case of the withdrawn
social and healthcare services reform, led to decisions that disregard the constitution,
fundamental rights, and the views of experts.
On the other hand, the reform made it more diﬃcult to politicise questions related to
gender equality, for example, to draw attention to the gender impacts of economic policy
or to challenge the weak gender equality policy. The managerialist reform contributed to
the development whereby political decision makers have begun to consider themselves as
neutral and impartial managers rather than representatives of political interests and ideol-
ogies and where political problems are seen as ones that can be solved by practical and
technocratic solutions (A Kantola 2006). One aspect of strategic public governance visible
especially in the views of the think tank Sitra, is that the government should set political
antagonisms and special interests aside and focus on serving the public interest: ‘The gov-
ernment – both at the Cabinet level and between senior civil service leaders – needs to act
as one, as a uniﬁed team with a commitment by individual members to collective action’
(Doz and Kosonen 2014, 11). This idea was also advanced by politicians, who during the
government talks constantly emphasised collegiality and collaboration. For example,
Prime Minister Sipilä announced that ‘there is only one party, the government party’ (Hel-
singin Sanomat May 23, 2015).
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The reform also provided politicians with the role of strategic managers whose purpose
was to outline a vision, set concrete objectives, ﬁnd practical and eﬀective solutions to
reach these objectives, and monitor progress. For example, in the beginning of the gov-
ernment talks, Prime Minister Sipilä expected his future ministers to think about goals
and numbers ‘in the evening when going to bed and in the morning when waking up’
(Helsingin Sanomat April 20, 2015). In this consensual and managerialist framework, gen-
dered austerity and the sidelining of gender equality do not appear as political choices
inﬂuenced by interests and ideologies but as neutral and necessary outcomes of outlining
and implementing the government’s strategic vision.
Conclusion
I have argued in this article, using Finland as my example, that in order to theorise the gen-
dered implications of austerity and the possibilities of feminist resistance, it is important to
understand how recent transformations of state and governance have facilitated and legit-
imised the adoption of gendered austerity measures and narrowed the room for demo-
cratic debate. Decisions about spending cuts are not only a reaction to a real or
constructed ‘crisis’ (Walby 2015) but also connected to recent, intertwined changes in
the way public ﬁnances are governed and in the way governments work.
I have suggested that the intensiﬁcation of austerity politics in Finland was connected
to two simultaneously planned and implemented governance reforms, which provided
the Finnish political elite with new tools to push forward longstanding ideas about
budget discipline and centralisation of ﬁscal powers. Whereas the EU reinforced develop-
ment of the new steering model for public ﬁnance tied national ﬁscal and budgetary pol-
icies to the EU’s economic governance rules and centralised control over spending on
public welfare services, the OECD inspired reform of the political steering process sub-
sumed all other political goals into the ﬁscal frame. In addition to facilitating and legitimis-
ing the adoption of highly gendered austerity measures and the dismantling of the Finnish
‘woman-friendly’ welfare state, the two governance reforms have narrowed the possibili-
ties of progressive gender equality policy.
The two reforms have also de-democratised and depoliticised policy making in a
manner that has made it more diﬃcult for feminist and other actors to challenge gendered
austerity. The reforms have centralised power over public ﬁnances and made the govern-
ment’s work more authoritarian, decreasing the possibility for democratic debate and civil
society organisations having their voices heard. The more rules based economic govern-
ance framework that allows the government to claim its hands are tied, and the view that
politicians are neutral managers who set ideologies and interests aside, further constrain
the possibilities for contestation and political debate.
My analysis of the Finnish case illustrates that rulesbased economic governance reforms
connected to the ‘competition state’ paradigm and managerialist NPM reforms aiming at a
‘strategic state’ may intertwine in a manner that enhances their gendered, de-democratis-
ing and depoliticising tendencies. The result of the collision of the two reform agendas is
enhanced gendered austerity as well as a more centralised and authoritarian decision
making where political questions about public spending are either kept away from demo-
cratic decision-making or hidden behind neutral speech about rules and good
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governance. ‘Competition state’ and ‘strategic state’ are therefore not conﬂicting or oppos-
ing ideas; they are diﬀerent sides of the same coin.
The Finnish case reveals that changes in economic governance and policy making
practices can be seen as a more fundamental form of austerity than spending cuts.
Austerity enhancing processes and practices may also condition decision making in
better economic times and under governments with diﬀerent political priorities. In
addition, governance reforms – in particular, economic governance reforms sanc-
tioned by outside actors such as the EU – are often harder to overturn than decisions
about levels of social beneﬁts. The Finnish case also illustrates how governance
reforms are, despite their potentially permanent impacts, a more silent and less con-
tested form of austerity than spending cuts. Spending cuts are often contested and
criticised in the media and parliaments, but changes in governance, especially
those that do not require legislative changes, often take place beyond the reach of
political and public debate. Another aspect of the lack of political debate is that gov-
ernance reforms are framed as neutral and technical solutions rather than political
decisions with political eﬀects.
The role of governance reforms in austerity politics raises questions about feminist and
other anti-austerity resistance. In Finland, the feminist critique of austerity has been
increasing even if austerity has proven to be a diﬃcult issue for established women’s
organisations with long traditions of cross-party collaboration and close links to the
state (Elomäki and Kantola 2017). In this critique, as well as in other critical public
debates about austerity, the new steering model for public ﬁnance and the reform of
the government’s political steering process have mainly gone unnoticed. Paying attention
to these reforms would be crucial not only because they have facilitated and legitimised
austerity, but also because they have constrained the possibilities of civil society actors to
inﬂuence economic policy.
Notes
1. The interviews have beenmade in the framework of other research projects but the new steer-
ing model for public ﬁnance and the General Government Fiscal Plan have been addressed in
the interviews. I will refer to the interviews by number (1–5).
2. The Sipilä government’s withdrawn social and healthcare reform would have tightened the
ﬁscal governance of social and healthcare services even further through transferring all
ﬁnancial power over these services from municipalities to the Ministry of Finance.
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